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We examine expertise acquisition incentives in a model of debt funding markets in
which expertise reduces the cost of acquiring information about underlying collateral.
Lenders acquiring expertise gain advantages in financial contracts with borrowers and
extract rents from them by creating fear of information production that gives rise
to illiquidity. As information about collateral decays over time, there is growth in
credit and expertise acquisition, making the economy more vulnerable to an aggregate
shock. This result suggests that the growth in the financial sector is associated with
the prevalence of opaque assets and a subsequent crisis.
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1 Introduction
The financial industry has aggressively acquired financial expertise. Philippon and Reshef
(2012) show that in recent decades, the US financial sector has increased IT spending and
attracted highly talented workers compared to other sectors of the economy. They also show
that these investments in expertise are strongly associated with a growth in remuneration
in the sector.1 The expertise allows financial firms to gather and process information about
complex assets more easily and provide their services more efficiently. However, given that
financial firms played a major role in the 2007–09 financial crisis, the social value of their
expertise has been questioned.2 Therefore, it is necessary to investigate why the trend of an
increasing expertise acquisition occurred within the financial industry and how this trend
could be accountable for the financial crisis.
In this study, we develop a model of debt funding markets in which investors acquire
financial expertise to reduce the cost of acquiring information about the quality of the collat-
eral. Information acquisition causes illiquidity, so that costly expertise acquisition is socially
wasteful. However, investors are willing to acquire expertise to threaten firms with the fears
of information acquisition and improve bargaining positions with firms, which allows for the
emergence of ignorant experts—investors that acquire expertise but do not use it to produce
information. In this case, the depreciation of information about collateral over time leads to
both a credit boom and growth in expertise acquisition, leaving financial markets vulnerable
to an aggregate shock. This finding offers an explanation about the linkage between the
prevalence of opaque assets, the growth in the financial sector, and the financial crisis.
We build on the idea that symmetric ignorance can enhance liquidity in markets and
that its breakdown can lead to a crisis, as advocated by Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), Dang
1See also Goldin and Katz (2008) for an increase in talented workers in the financial industry and Kaplan
and Rauh (2010) for their increasing representation among top income earners.
2Adair Turner, a former chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, comments in Turner (2010)
that: “There is no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of the financial system in the
rich developed world over the last 20 to 30 years has driven increased growth or stability, and it is possible
for financial activity to extract rents from the real economy rather than to deliver economic value”.
2
et al. (2015), and Holmström (2015).3 When issuing “information-insensitive debt,” in which
there is no advantage from acquiring information about the quality of underlying collateral,
financial markets are free from adverse selection and highly liquid. However, when the debt
becomes information-sensitive in response to a shock, private information production ensues,
and liquidity dries up. We explore the relationship between the information sensitivity of
debt and expertise acquisition for a better understanding of recent developments in the
financial sector.
As in Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), we consider a dynamic model in which firms borrow
funds from investors by offering short-term collateralized debt to finance a project. The
assets used as collateral have a heterogeneous quality, high or low. Every period, firms
may be hit by idiosyncratic shocks that transform collateral with known quality into opaque
collateral with high perceived quality. That is, after receiving the idiosyncratic shock, firms
have collateral of which the true quality is unknown for the investors and firms. However,
after finding a firm, each investor can acquire information about the quality of collateral
at a cost for making lending decisions—lending when the collateral is of high quality and
refusing to lend when it is of low quality. Thus, information acquisition can reduce the
possibility of funding. We interpret the assets as preexisting financial securities (e.g., asset-
and mortgage-backed securities) that are so complex and opaque that agents find it difficult
to evaluate their fundamental values without expert due diligence.
There are two important departures from Gorton and Ordoñez (2014). First, they as-
sume investment projects featuring Leontief technology, whereas we assume a fixed-sized
investment project. Second, in their model, the cost of information acquisition is exoge-
nously given, whereas in our model, each investor can acquire expertise that reduces the
cost of information acquisition before finding a firm. Under this setup, firms with opaque
collateral want to prevent investors from acquiring information even by promising them high
compensation, and thus anticipating this result, investors acquire expertise and create the
3The idea that information can destroy economic value goes back to Hirshleifer (1971), who shows that
public information restricts risk sharing. See also Gorton and Pennacchi (1990).
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fears of information acquisition.
We demonstrate how the decay of information about collateral over time leads to the
emergence of ignorant experts and financial fragility. The firms with collateral known as low
quality can obtain financing through uninformed lending after the idiosyncratic shock hits;
accordingly, information about collateral decays and credit expands over time. The rise in
lending without information acquisition increases the opportunities for investors to extract
rents, encouraging their expertise acquisition. However, booms do not last indefinitely. As a
boom continues and expertise acquisition grows, investors are more likely to produce infor-
mation about opaque collateral in response to aggregate shocks that reduce the collateral’s
average quality. This informational regime change, from a state in which no one acquires
information about the collateral’s true quality to a state in which investors start to produce
information, leads to a deterioration in funding liquidity and a decline in aggregate output.
Thus, as opaque assets circulate more widely in markets, credit and the level of expertise
will grow, and the likelihood of a subsequent crisis increases.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that the emergence of ignorant experts
leads to a credit boom, due to their ignorance, and a subsequent crisis, due to their expertise.
This offers a coherent explanation for the recent financial crisis. Prior to the financial
crisis, securitization, or the process of pooling and tranching a set of assets, created large
quantities of AAA-rated asset- and mortgage-backed securities from risky assets such as
subprime mortgages (Coval et al., 2009). Although these securitized products were complex
and opaque, they were considered by investors to be safe and were regularly used as collateral
in the repo markets. During this time period, we also observed the growth in finance; the
financial sector share of GDP increased from about 5 percent in 1980 to about 8 percent in
2006 (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013, Philippon, 2015).
Subsequently, the repo markets collapsed during the crisis and were recognized as a major
source of financial instability (Gorton and Metrick, 2012).4 Gorton and Metrick (2010)
4A significant rise in margins in bilateral repos is observed in a market wherein dealers lend to clients
(Copeland et al., 2014). Copeland et al. (2014) and Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) document that, in contrast
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demonstrate that haircuts on subprime-related assets were zero before the crisis but then
increased to 100 percent by 2009. By contrast, haircuts on non-subprime-related products
increased from zero percent to approximately 20 percent. Our model implies that the growth
in securitization that produces opaque assets and fuels a credit boom encourages an active
acquisition of expertise for rent extraction, which increases the likelihood of information
production and a subsequent collapse in markets.
Related literature: Our study contributes to the literature on the optimal level of financial
expertise. Glode et al. (2012), Biais et al. (2015), Fishman and Parker (2015), Bolton et
al. (2016), and Kurlat (2019) argue that there is excessive acquisition of financial expertise.
While in these studies, having more expertise means producing more information, our model
treats expertise acquisition and information acquisition separately, and thereby shows that
information decay can go hand-in-hand with increasing expertise acquisition and lead to a
boom and bust cycle. Asano (2021) analyzes expertise acquisition in a similar model but
focuses on the relationship between financial market developments and financial expertise. In
contrast, our study stresses the linkage between the growth in financial expertise and boom-
bust cycles. Philippon (2010), Cahuc and Challe (2012), and Shakhnov (2018) examine
the optimal size of the financial sector by considering the allocation of talents between the
financial and nonfinancial (productive) sectors.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the relationship between adverse selection
and financial crises. Although this literature primarily treats information asymmetry as
exogenous (e.g., Kurlat, 2013; Chari et al., 2014; Guerrieri and Shimer, 2014; Bigio, 2015),
Gorton and Ordoñez (2014, 2020) develop a model of endogenous information asymmetry
and show that a depletion of information about collateral generates a credit boom followed
by a crisis at the point of informational regime change. We offer two contributions relative to
Gorton and Ordoñez (2014, 2020). First, while they assume that the level of expertise (i.e.,
to bilateral repo markets, the tri-party repo markets, in which dealers mainly borrowed funds from cash
providers (such as money market funds and security lenders) were relatively stable.
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the cost of information acquisition) is exogenously given, we allow for expertise acquisition
and show that it arises as opaque collateral becomes circulated. Second, the prevalence of
opaque collateral accompanied by the growth in expertise makes the economy more vulner-
able to aggregate shocks than without the growth in expertise.
Outline: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set-
ting of the static model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium behavior within periods.
Section 4 analyzes the dynamics. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Model
In this section, we describe the setup of the model. Section 2.1 introduces the basic environ-
ment and Section 2.2 imposes parametric assumptions.
2.1 Environment
The economy has a single good that is used for investment and consumption. Time is discrete
and continues forever: t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The model is populated by overlapping generations
of a continuum of agents with unit mass who live for two periods as young and old. Agents
derive utility from consumption at the end of each period and are risk-neutral with no
discounting between periods. When young, each agent becomes an investor and is endowed
with a sufficient amount of goods. When old, each agent becomes a firm and is endowed
with a project but no goods. We assume that goods are perishable and there is no storage
technology. This means that firms need external financing. We also assume that firms are
protected by limited liability.
A project that each firm has requires a fixed investment I > 0. It produces nothing in
the case of failure and produces returns R > 0 in the case of success. The project is subject
to moral hazard, as in Holmström and Tirole (1997, 1998). The firm can choose whether to

















Figure 1: Idiosyncratic shock
p ∈ (0, 1]. In the case of misbehaving, the firm enjoys private benefit B > 0 but must accept
that the probability of success decreases by ∆p ∈ (0, p).
One unit of indivisible asset, which has two types of quality, good and bad, is distributed
only to each agent of the initial generation (t = 0). A fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] of the initial agents
receive a good asset, and a fraction 1 − φ of the initial agents receive a bad asset. While
the intrinsic value of a good asset is C > 0, the intrinsic value of a bad asset is zero. Only
when an owner of the asset extracts its intrinsic value, it disappears. This means that an
asset is storable and can be transferred to the next generation and used as collateral unless
its owner consumes its intrinsic value.
We assume that at t = 0, all agents are fully informed about the true value of the assets.
However, every period, the quality of the asset may change because of idiosyncratic shocks.
For each asset, the idiosyncratic shock does not hit with probability λ ∈ (0, 1) and hits
with probability 1− λ, regardless of the quality of the asset. While the quality of the asset
that does not receive the shock remains unchanged, the quality of the asset that receives
the shock becomes good with probability φ and bad with probability 1 − φ. While the
shock is observable, whether the asset becomes good or bad after the shock is unobservable.
The structure of idiosyncratic shocks is depicted in Figure 1. When the true quality of
the collateral is known, the shock makes the quality opaque, and then no one knows the
true quality of the collateral. We view these assets as preexisting financial securities, such
as mortgage-related securities, and consider that the complexity of their design makes it
difficult to estimate their real value.
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To run a project, firms need to rely on external financing. Each firm is randomly matched
with a single investor, and the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the investor. The
assumptions of random matching and bilateral contract are intended to capture the fact that
the new complex securities are mainly traded in an over-the-counter market (e.g., Duffie et
al., 2005). The financial contract has the following structure: in period t, (i) the investor
contributes I; (ii) when the project succeeds, the investor receives Rit and the firm receives
R−Rit from its cash flow; and (iii) when the project fails, both parties receive nothing from
the investment return, and the investor seizes the collateral.5
After receiving a financial contract from a firm but before deciding whether to accept
the contract, an investor can produce costly private information about the quality of the
collateral that the firm pledges. By paying γt ∈ [0, γmax] units of goods, each investor knows
the true quality of the collateral perfectly. The cost of information acquisition γt can be
interpreted as an inverse measure of the investor’s financial expertise at period t. This
means investors with lower γt have more expertise. The underlying idea is that investors
who have more financial expertise find it easier to gather and process information about
complex assets. The important feature of our model is that the level of expertise γt is
an endogenous variable. Before financial contracts are offered, each investor chooses γt,
incurring a cost ψ(γmax − γt), with ψ ≥ 0 and ψ
′ ≥ 0. While γt is publicly observable,
the acquisition of information is unobservable. We assume that when the investor acquires
private information, the information becomes public. This assumption allows all agents to
share beliefs on collateral and restores information symmetry.
Figure 2 shows the sequence of events within a period. Each investor (or young agent)
chooses the level of financial expertise γt and then, idiosyncratic shocks occur. Each firm (or
old agent) is matched with a single investor and offers financial contracts Rit. After receiving
the contract, the investor decides whether to acquire information about the quality of the
pledged collateral and then whether to accept the offered contract. If the investor accepts the
5Even if we consider a more general contract that allows the investor to seize collateral with some prob-




















contract, the firm starts to run a project and chooses between behaving and misbehaving.
If the investor rejects the contract, both the firm and the investor continue holding their
own endowments. Then, all outcomes are realized. At the end of the period, the owner of
each asset decides whether to sell it to the owner’s counterpart. For simplicity, we assume
that when assets are traded, a buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a seller. Finally,
consumption takes place.
We define an equilibrium in the following way.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is given by the firms’ contracts Rit, their choice between behav-
ing and misbehaving, investors’ expertise γt, their decisions on information acquisition and
financing, and firms’ and investors’ beliefs, such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• Firms’ contracts Rit and the choice between behaving and misbehaving are optimal,
where beliefs and the investors’ strategies are taken as given;
• The investors’ decisions on expertise γt, information acquisition, and financing are
optimal, where beliefs and the firms’ strategies are taken as given;
• Beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given equilibrium strategies, whenever possible.
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2.2 Parametric assumptions
We make two parametric assumptions. First, if a firm behaves, project has positive net
present value (NPV), whereas if the firm misbehaves, the project has negative NPV, even
with the inclusion of private benefit:
Assumption 1 pR > I > (p−∆p)R +B.
Second, the moral hazard problem is relatively severe so that collateral is necessary to
compensate for the lack of pledgeability:






The first inequality implies that the expected collateral value φC covers the gap between the





. The second inequality implies
that firms whose collateral is known as bad cannot obtain financing.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we characterize equilibrium behavior within a period. Let φ̃ be agents’
conjecture about the probability that a firm’s collateral is good. Given the information
structure about collateral, the beliefs about collateral φ̃ take three values: 0, φ, and 1. When
the collateral is identified as bad (good), the beliefs about the collateral become φ̃ = 0
(φ̃ = 1). When the quality of collateral is unknown because of idiosyncratic shocks, the
beliefs are represented by φ̃ = φ. As in Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), the distribution of
beliefs about collateral value, ft(φ̃), is the unique state variable in period t. Thus, given this
state variable, all agents choose the optimal strategies in each period.
We begin by analyzing asset markets in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 focuses on funding
markets and characterizes the optimal financial contract. Section 3.3 derives the equilibrium
level of financial expertise.
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3.1 Asset markets
Because investors use an asset as collateral in the next period, they evaluate the asset more
highly than do the firms. This implies that a firm that holds an asset becomes a seller,
whereas an investor that does not hold the asset becomes a buyer. Since both the investor
and the firm have common beliefs about collateral, φ̃, the investor offers the transfer price
φ̃C that makes the firm indifferent between selling the asset and consuming the intrinsic
value.
3.2 Funding markets
Given that investors can acquire information about collateral at a cost of γt, firms with
collateral φ̃ = φ optimally choose between a financial contract that triggers information
acquisition (referred to as information-sensitive debt) or one that does not trigger information
acquisition (referred to as information-insensitive debt). When firms have collateral φ̃ =
0 or 1, however, they necessarily choose information-insensitive debt because investors do
not have incentives to acquire information. We show that for firms with collateral φ̃ = φ,
issuing information-insensitive debt enhances liquidity, but this may be costly because they
need to promise investors a compensation that is commensurate with the level of their
expertise to prevent information acquisition.
3.2.1 Information-insensitive debt
Consider a situation where a firm with collateral φ̃ offers an information-insensitive debt




p(R−Rit,II)− (1− p)φ̃C (1)
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subject to
pRit,II + (1− p)φ̃C ≥ I, (2)
p(R−Rit,II)− (1− p)φ̃C ≥ 0, (3)
p(R−Rit,II)− (1− p)φ̃C ≥ (p−∆p)(R−R
i
t,II)− (1− p+∆p)φ̃C +B, (4)
pRit,II + (1− p)φ̃C − I ≥ φ̃
[
pRit,II + (1− p)C − I
]
− γt. (5)
The objective function (1) is the firm’s net payoff. (2) and (3) are the individual rationality
(IR) constraints for the investor and the firm, respectively, requiring that agents earn non-
negative payoff from financial contracts. (4) is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint,
which requires that the firm prefers behaving to misbehaving.
(5) ensures that the investors’ payoff without information acquisition (the left-hand side)
is larger than the payoff with information acquisition (the right-hand side). When investors
acquire information, they accept the offered contract and provide funds if the firm has good
collateral and refuse the offered contract if the firm has bad collateral from Assumption 2.






The left-hand side of (6) represents the benefit of acquiring information. The investor who
encounters a firm with bad collateral with probability 1− φ̃ can avoid a loss of I − pRit,II by
not lending. If this benefit is smaller than the cost of acquiring information γt, the investor
chooses not to acquire information.
First, suppose that (6) is not binding. A decrease in compensation for the investor
Rit,II increases the firm’s payoff (1) and strengthens the incentive to behave from (4). This
leads the firm to decrease Rit,II until the IR constraint (2) is binding; that is, the expected
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+ φ̃C ≥ I, (7)





and collateral value φ̃C exceeds the cost of investment I, the firm secures financing. We can
confirm that from Assumption 2, (7) does not hold for firms with bad collateral (φ̃ = 0)
and thus they cannot obtain financing. In contrast, for firms with collateral φ̃ = φ or 1,
(7) holds, implying that they obtain financing and receive payoffs equal to the entire social
surplus pR− I, where (3) is not binding.
Then, we check the condition under which (6) is not binding. In the case of firms with
collateral φ̃ = 1, (6) is always satisfied because they do not have incentives to acquire
information. In the case of firms with collateral φ̃ = φ, Rit,II can be determined at which
(6) binds instead of (2) because a lower Rit,II strengthens the investors’ incentives to acquire
information. However, if γt is sufficiently high such that
γt ≥ γII ≡ (1− p)(1− φ)φC, (8)
then (6) does not bind.
In contract, if γt is in the intermediate range such that γII ≤ γt < γII where
γII ≡ (1− φ) [(1− p)φC − pR + I] , (9)
then (6) binds so that the expected repayment is: pRit,II = I −
γt
1−φ
. This means that for
the investor with lower γt, the firm must lower the benefit of information production by
increasing repayment Rit,II and reducing the expected loss that the informed investor is able
to avoid. In this case, the investor earns a net positive payoff.
Finally, if γt is sufficiently low such that γt < γII , the firm does not obtain funds through
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information-insensitive debt because the repayment Rit,II must be so high that the firm loses
money.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and firms offer information-insensitive
debt contracts.
(i) Firms with collateral φ̃ = 1 obtain financing and receive the net payoff pR− I, whereas
the investors’ net payoff is zero.









pR− I if γII ≤ γt,
pR− I − (1− p)φC +
γt
1− φ
if γII ≤ γt < γII ,
(10)










if γII ≤ γt < γII ;
(11)
if γt < γII , the firms obtain no financing.
(iii) Firms with collateral φ̃ = 0 obtain no financing.
Lemma 1 implies that if the level of expertise is in the intermediate range (γII ≤ γt < γII),
as the level of expertise is higher, the investor is able to extract larger rents from firms.
In information-insensitive contracts, financial expertise allows investors to improve their
bargaining position with firms that have all the bargaining power by creating the fear of
information acquisition.
3.2.2 Information-sensitive debt
Next, we consider that a firm offers the information-sensitive debt contract Rit,IS for an
investor with γt. Since firms with collateral φ̃ = 0 or 1 do not issue the information-sensitive
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debt, we focus on firms with collateral φ̃ = φ. The optimal information-sensitive contract is












pRit,IS + (1− p)C − I
]















The firm maximizes the net expected payoff (12), subject to the IR constraint for the investor
(13), the IR constraint for the firm (14), the IC constraint (15), and the constraint that
triggers information acquisition (16).
It is straightforward to characterize the optimal contract inducing information acqui-
sition. A lower Rit,IS increases the firm’ profit (12) and relaxes the constraints (15) and
(16). Thus, the firm decreases Rit,IS until (13) binds; that is, the expected repayment is:
pRit,IS = I − (1 − p)C +
γt
φ
. Since (15) is satisfied under Assumption 2, if γt is sufficiently
low such that
γt ≤ γIS ≡ φmin {(1− p)(1− φ)C, pR− I} , (17)
then (14) and (16) are also satisfied, and thus financing occurs. The firm receives the entire
social surplus φ(pR− I)− γt, where the firm has to incur the cost of information acquisition
γt. Otherwise, at least one of the constraints (14) and (16) are violated and financing does
not occur. The following lemma summarizes this argument.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and firms with collateral φ̃ = φ offer
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information-sensitive debt contracts. They obtain financing and receive the payoff,
U
f
IS(γt) = φ(pR− I)− γt if γt ≤ γIS, (18)
whereas the investors’ payoff is zero; if γt > γIS, the firms obtain no financing.
Lemma 2 implies that if the level of expertise is sufficiently high, greater expertise ben-
efits firms with opaque collateral but not investors, in contrast to information-insensitive
contracts.
3.2.3 Optimal contract
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, a firm with collateral φ̃ = φ chooses between information-
insensitive and information-sensitive contracts to maximize its payoff. As shown in Figure 3,
the firm’s payoff depends on γt. U
f
II is nondecreasing in γt from (10), whereas U
f
IS is de-
creasing in γt from (18). On the one hand, the firm chooses to offer information-insensitive
contracts if U fII ≥ U
f





[(1− p)φC − (1− φ)(pR− I)] , (19)
and if information-insensitive contracts are feasible, that is, γt ≥ γII . That is, if γt is
sufficiently high that γt ≥ max{γII , γ
c}, firms offer information-insensitive contracts. On the
other hand, if γt < max{γII , γ
c} and γt ≤ γIS, firms offer information-sensitive contracts.
The following proposition summarizes the result of the equilibrium contract.
Proposition 1 (Optimal financial contract) Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) Firms with collateral φ̃ = 1 offer information-insensitive contracts.
(ii) Firms with collateral φ̃ = φ offer contracts depending on their investors’ expertise γt:
(a) If γt ≥ max{γII , γ
















Figure 3: The comparison of payoffs of firms with collateral φ̃ = φ between information-insensitive
contracts and information-sensitive contracts when γII ≤ γ
c and γIS = φ(pR− I)
(b) If γt < max{γII , γ
c} and γt ≤ γIS, they choose information-sensitive contracts.
(c) Otherwise, they cannot secure financing.
(iii) Firms with collateral φ̃ = 0 cannot secure financing.
3.3 Acquisition of Financial Expertise
From Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Proposition 1, the investor’s payoff in the stage of optimal
contracting depends on the firm’s collateral φ̃ and the investor’s expertise γt. If the investor
meets the firm with collateral φ̃ = 0 or 1, the investor receives nothing regardless of γt. If















≤ γt < γII ,
0 otherwise,
(20)
as depicted in Figure 4. If max{γII , γ
c} ≤ γt < γII , investors with lower γt earn higher payoffs
by using their expertise as a threat to firms that offer information-insensitive contracts;
otherwise, the investors earn zero payoff.
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Figure 4: Investors’ payoff when they meet firms with collateral φ̃ = φ
that investors meet firms with collateral φ̃ = φ with probability ft(φ) at the funding market,




i(γt)− ψ(γmax − γt). (21)
To guarantee that investors acquire expertise in equilibrium (i.e., γ∗t < γmax) and γ
∗
t is
unique, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 γmax and the cost function ψ(·) are such that
1. γII < γmax ≤ γII ,
2. ψ(0) = 0, ψ′ > 0, ψ′′ > 0, and limγt→γmax ψ




The cost function that satisfies this assumption is illustrated in Figure 4.




























γmax −max{0, γII , γ
c}
)
is sufficiently high, investors choose the level of exper-
tise that equates marginal benefit and marginal cost. When ψ′
(





sufficiently low, investors acquire expertise to the point at which additional acquisition of ex-
pertise stops the firms from offering information-insensitive contracts: γ∗t = max{0, γII , γ
c}.
In both cases, there is expertise acquisition but never information acquisition in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Emergence of ignorant experts) Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold.
Then, in equilibrium, the level of financial expertise γ∗t is given by (22) and all firms with
collateral φ̃ = φ or 1 obtain financing by issuing information-insensitive debt.
4 Dynamics
This section analyzes the dynamics of the model. Section 4.1 shows how investors’ compen-
sations and levels of expertise grow and the credit expands as information about collateral
decays over time. Section 4.2 introduces a negative aggregate shock on asset quality and
shows that as levels of expertise grow, a crisis is more likely to happen.
4.1 Credit boom and escalating levels of expertise
At t = 0, there is no opaque collateral and only firms that have collateral φ̃ = 1 obtain funds.
With the specific structure of idiosyncratic shocks, the shock makes the quality unknown
and changes the associated belief from φ̃ = 0 or φ̃ = 1 to φ̃ = φ. When a firm with collateral
φ̃ = φ receives the shock, the belief does not change.
Figure 5 illustrates the transitional dynamics with a numerical example. In every period,
some firms receive a shock and have collateral φ̃ = φ, which allows them to secure financing by
offering information-insensitive contracts. Correspondingly, the fraction of opaque collateral
increases over time (upper-left panel). After t period, the distribution of beliefs concerning
the probability of good collateral, ft(φ̃), is given by: ft(0) = λ
t(1 − φ), ft(φ) = 1 − λ
t, and
ft(1) = λ
tφ. Because firms with bad collateral are able to invest in projects after receiving
the shock, the net aggregate output, given by (1 − λt + λtφ)(pR − I), increases over time
(upper-right panel).
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Cost of information acquisition









Notes: The horizontal axis represents periods from t = 0 to t = 100. We assume




2 and γmax = γII . The parameters used are p = 0.7, R = 2.5,
∆p = 0.3, I = 1.5, B = 0.45, C = 1.3, φ = 0.8, λ = 0.93, and d = 0.0035.
This implies that as a fraction of the opaque collateral increases, investors have a greater
opportunity to extract rents by information-insensitive lending and are more willing to ac-
quire expertise. Thus, as time passes, the cost of information acquisition, γ∗t , decreases




Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold. A fraction of opaque collateral, net
aggregate output, levels of expertise, and expected profits for investors grow over time.
Proposition 3 highlights the linkage between the prevalence of opaque assets, a credit
boom, and growth in the financial sector. This captures the important aspects during the
run-up to the financial crisis. Before the crisis, dramatic growth in securitization produced
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opaque financial securities and fueled a credit boom. During this period, the financial in-
dustry grew; the financial sector share of GDP increased from about 5 percent in 1980 to
about 8 percent in 2006 (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013, Philippon, 2015). Our model
suggests that an increase in the use of securitized products in financial transactions leads
the financial sector to invest more in expertise and extract larger rents from the corporate
sector of the economy.
4.2 Financial fragility
Next, we introduce negative aggregate shocks on asset quality. We assume that a negative
aggregate shock makes the fraction (1−η), with η ∈ (0, 1), of good assets become bad assets.
Agents can observe whether the aggregate shock hits but cannot observe who receives the
shock. Thus, the aggregate shock changes beliefs φ̃ = φ into φ̃ = ηφ and beliefs φ̃ = 1
into φ̃ = η, while beliefs φ̃ = 0 remain unchanged. Suppose that the aggregate shock hits
unexpectedly after the acquisition of expertise by investors, but before the offering of financial
contracts.6 This implies that when the aggregate shock hits, investors cannot adjust their
levels of expertise, but firms that have collateral with belief φ̃ = ηφ or φ̃ = η can design
financial contracts.
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of aggregate shocks on the payoff of firms with collateral
φ̃ = φ and the financial contracts when γII ≤ γ
c. After the belief is reduced to φ̃ = ηφ,
the expected payoff of the firm offering information-sensitive contracts decreases because
the probability of financing decreases. The expected payoff of firms that offer information-
insensitive contracts also decreases, because the increased probability that an investor meets
a firm with bad collateral strengthens information acquisition incentives and leads to greater
rents for the investor. If the aggregate shock 1−η is sufficiently small, the latter effect domi-
nates the former, implying that the information-sensitive region widens and the information-
6We consider only the unexpected aggregate shock for simplicity. Even if investors anticipate the aggregate
shock hits, as long as the probability of the shock is sufficiently small, they do not refrain from acquiring
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Figure 6: Effect of an aggregate shock on financial contracts when γII ≤ γ
c
insensitive region narrows.
In this case, whether the aggregate shock induces an informational regime change depends
on the level of expertise. When investors have a low level of expertise (for example, γ′ in
Figure 6), the firms with collateral φ̃ = ηφ choose information-insensitive contracts. However,
when investors acquire a high level of expertise (for example, γ′′), the shock induces the firms
with collateral φ̃ = ηφ to choose information-sensitive rather than information-insensitive
contracts.7
Figure 7 shows how the economy fluctuates in response to aggregate shocks as a solid
blue line. To simplify the explanation, we assume that the aggregate shock 1 − η is suffi-
ciently small such that firms with collateral φ̃ = η offer information-insensitive contracts in
the equilibrium path. After the shock is realized in period 50, the fraction of good assets
decreases from φ to ηφ and then moves back to the original level, φ, because of idiosyncratic
mean-reverting shocks (upper-left panel). When the increase in opaque collateral and the
corresponding credit boom continues for a sufficiently long period, investors have acquired
7When γII ≤ γ
c, both the information-sensitive and information-insensitive regions narrow and the region
of no financing widens, if the aggregate shock 1− η is sufficiently large. When γII > γ
c, the aggregate shock
necessarily narrows the information-sensitive and information-insensitive regions and widens the region of no
financing. In these situations, the aggregate shock can prevent firms with collateral φ̃ = ηφ from obtaining
funds. However, as this possibility does not change our qualitative result, we focus on the situation in which
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Figure 7: The boom and bust
Notes: The horizontal axis represents periods from t = 0 to t = 100. We assume that η = 0.94 and
aggregate shocks hit in periods t = 50. In the case of no intervention, the cost of expertise acquisition




2 is small such that d = 0.0035. In the case of intervention, the cost of
expertise acquisition is large such that γ∗
t
= γmax for any period.
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a high level of expertise (lower-left panel) and thus, the aggregate shock induces the firms
with opaque collateral to select information-sensitive contracts. As a result, if their collateral
is identified as bad, they cannot obtain financing, and the net aggregate output must drop
sharply (upper-right panel). The disappearance of opaque collateral discourages investors
from acquiring expertise and reduces their profits (lower-right panel). Then, the economy
begins to recover and the net aggregate output and investors’ expected profits grow again.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1–3 hold. Assume that 4(pR− I) > (1−p)C and
that a negative aggregate shock 1− η hits unexpectedly, where




(1− p)C + pR− I
. (23)
There exists a time tc such that if t < tc, the shock does not affect aggregate output, and if
t ≥ tc, the shock generates a crisis.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As a comparison with the equilibrium path without any government intervention, the dot-
ted red line in Figure 7 shows the effect of government intervention in expertise acquisition
on financial stability. We consider that the government increases the cost of expertise acqui-
sition ψ(γmax − γt) for any γt so that investors do not acquire expertise; that is, γ
∗
t = γmax.
Despite the aggregate shock, the firms can issue information-insensitive debt without fear
of information acquisition. Then, the net aggregate output grows steadily. Therefore, the
government can stabilize the economy by preventing investors from acquiring expertise and
maintaining symmetric ignorance.
We identify the growth in expertise as a source of financial fragility. In Gorton and
Ordoñez (2014), the level of expertise is exogenously given, and thus, the possibility that an
aggregate shock causes a decline in output is independent of a fraction of opaque collateral.
By contrast, our model predicts that the possibility that the shock generates a drop in output
rises as a fraction of opaque collateral increases, because it encourages the acquisition of
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expertise and leaves the financial market more vulnerable to a shock. This difference implies
that a credit boom with growth in expertise tends to cause a large crash compared to the
one without growth in expertise.
5 Conclusion
This study analyzes expertise acquisition incentives in a model of debt funding markets in
which expertise enables the production of information about the underlying collateral at a
low cost. We show that in equilibrium, investors acquire expertise not to produce information
but to extract rents from firms. The emergence of such ignorant experts leads to a credit
boom, due to their ignorance, and a subsequent crisis, due to their expertise. Our theory
proposes a novel explanation that links the prevalence of opaque assets with growth in the
financial sector and the financial crisis.
In this study, we focused on the effect of financial expertise on funding liquidity. However,
financial expertise can influence market liquidity as well because the quality of assets traded
in markets is also heterogenous. This implies that the growth in financial expertise can
change liquidity management by financial institutions. Analyzing the interplay between
expertise acquisition and liquidity management is an important area for future research.
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Proposition 1 suggests that the information-insensitive region is γt ≥ max{γII , γ
c}.
If 4(pR− I) > (1− p)C, then for any φ,
γc − γII =
1− φ
2− φ
[pR− I − (1− φ)φ(1− p)C] > 0. (24)
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γc given by (19) is decreasing in φ for φ ∈ [φc, 1] because the total differentiation of (19)




(1− p)C + pR− I
(2− φ)2
{
φ2 − 4φ+ 3−
(1− p)C
(1− p)C + pR− I
}
< 0. (25)
Thus, we have max{γII , γ
c} = γc < γ̂c = max{γ̂II , γ̂
c}, where




[(1− p)ηφC − (1− ηφ)(pR− I)] , (27)
implying that the aggregate shock that reduces the belief φ̃ = φ to φ̃ = ηφ makes the
information-insensitive region narrower.
Suppose that the first aggregate shock hits in period t. If γ∗t ≥ max{γ̂II , γ̂
c}, firms that
have collateral φ̃ = ηφ issue information-insensitive debt, and the shock does not affect
aggregate output given by (1−λt+λtφ)(pR− I). If γ∗t < max{γ̂II , γ̂
c}, firms with collateral
φ̃ = ηφ issue information-sensitive debt or cannot receive financing. In either case, aggregate
output declines.
Since γ∗t given by (22), where ft(φ) = 1 − λ




c}, there exists a threshold tc ∈ [0,∞) such that for t < tc, an aggregate shock
does not affect output, and for t ≥ tc, the shock causes a drop in output. Otherwise, for any
t, the aggregate shock does not affect output.
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